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Should Insider Trading in Credit Default Swap Markets be
Regulated? The Landmark Significance of SEC v. Rorech
Adam Reiser*
INTRODUCTION
On May 4th, 2009 the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) brought suit against Jon-Paul Rorech and Renato
Negrin for alleged insider trading with credit default swaps (CDSs) in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
SEC v. Rorech is unique among SEC enforcement actions because it is
the first case involving insider trading in credit derivatives.2 This pa-
per analyzes Rorech by examining insider trading in CDS markets.
Until the recent passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, lawmakers left CDS
markets largely unregulated, 3 consequently making them a fertile
ground for insider trading. While insider trading in securities markets
has repeatedly been judicially condemned, 4 some scholars have de-
fended the practice as an effective mechanism to promote market effi-
ciency and productivity. 5 This paper asks whether the insider trading
regulations currently imposed on securities markets should be simi-
larly imposed upon CDS markets.
Part I overviews insider trading in securities markets.6 Part II re-
views the CDS market, notes empirical evidence of CDS insider trad-
* 2010 graduate of the University of Utah's JDIMBA program; currently serving as law clerk
to Hon. 0. Peter Sherwood, New York Supreme Court, Commercial Division. The author thanks
Professor Christian Johnson and Dr. Micah Allred for their scholarly insights and the DePaul
Business and Commercial Law Journal for its swift and thorough edit of this article.
1. SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2. Credit default swaps are the most widely used kind of credit derivative. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 220 (2008).
3. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2011)) (exempting all over-the-counter deriva-
tives, which includes CDSs, from regulation).
4. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
5. See, e.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis Carl-
ton & Daniel Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
6. CDSs and securities are highly similar. Both involve (1) wagering on the financial future of
an entity largely outside of one's control; (2) securing an increased return if one's wager is accu-
rate; (3) receiving a return that is correlated to the financial history of the entity on which one
wagers (i.e. those who invest with financially unproven firms reap larger rewards if the firm is
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ing, and concludes by discussing Rorech, the latest chapter in insider
trading regulation. Part III analyzes whether insider trading in CDS
markets should be permitted; it also discusses the lessons Rorech
teaches and what it signifies in the future of financial regulation.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING
Because this paper operates on the assumption that insider trading
in securities markets is the most analogous model for insider trading
in CDS markets,7 this Part briefly describes insider trading in securi-
ties markets. Defined simply, insider trading is engaging in a securi-
ties transaction with the aid of material, non-public information.8
Insider trading in securities markets has long puzzled courts,
lawmakers, and commentators. The difficulty of solving the insider
trading dilemma centers on pinning down exactly why the practice is
culpable at all. Bargaining with asymmetrical information, the core
premise of insider trading, is practiced in negotiation and contract are-
nas with little regulatory interference. 9 The parties themselves regu-
late the conduct of their counterparties, employing judicial assistance
at their own expense.
The dynamic changes, however, when parties move their transac-
tions from one-on-one, in-person transactions to a public security ex-
change. Securities transactions, which at their core are financial
contracts, are regulated in part because the unique asymmetries that
exist between publicly traded companies and their investors make
contract law insufficient to provide adequate remedies for injured in-
vestors.10 In other words, at some point the advantage one party gains
as a result of asymmetrical information becomes significant enough
for the law to intervene and punish the party for exploiting that
advantage.
No federal statute or regulation explicitly provides a sweeping pro-
hibition on insider trading. Rather, two provisions of the 1934 Ex-
successful; similarly, those willing to sell CDS protection for unproven reference entities will
likely reap larger rewards if the reference asset is faithful in its debt obligation.).
7. See supra note 6 for explanation of this assumption.
8. STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 1 (2d ed. 2007) ("[Tihe phrase
insider trading thus includes ... individuals who trade . . . on the basis of material information
unknown by the investing public at large.").
9. Prior to the passage of the 1934 Exchange Act, insider trading was not only lawful, but
appears to have been encouraged. See Nasser Arshadi & Thomas H. Esyssell, THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING 43 (1993) (noting how, prior to the Exchange Act,
insider trading was regarded as a "perquisite granted to corporate insiders").
10. See John Mahoney, The Development of Securities Law in the United States, 47 J. OF ACCT.
RES. 325 (2009).
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change Act and two SEC rules combine to regulate the three areas of
insider trading lawmakers and regulators have deemed most harmful.
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, commonly known as the "short
swing provision," regulates trading by corporate insiders but only
within a narrow time frame." Whenever insiders sell and purchase
company stock within a six-month time frame, 16(b) holds them
strictly liable for any profits gained or losses avoided irrespective of
whether the insider actually used material, non-public information to
make her decision. 12 The SEC crafted Rule 14e-3 to regulate trading
on material, non-public information but the rule only applies to tender
offers.13
Finally, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is undoubtedly the
strongest and farthest reaching weapon available to curb insider trad-
ing, and the rule most resembling a "catchall" provision applicable to
insider trading. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person "[to]
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
.. any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. '14
The SEC in turn promulgated Rule 10(b)(5), which makes it unlaw-
ful "to (a) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or (c)
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. 15 From 10(b)(5) emerged
three judicially crafted theories of insider trading liability: The Equal
Access Model of Liability, the Fiduciary Duty Model of Liability, and
the Misappropriation Model of Liability. While each model's scope of
liability varies, each succeeds in condemning the practice of trading
with the aid of material, non-public information. Part III discusses
these theories in detail.
10(b)(5) and its judicial progeny apply only to securities and, by
virtue of a subsequent amendment, "securities-based swap agree-
ments. ' 16 Financial instruments such as CDSs, unless they are classi-
fied as securities or securities-based swap agreements, are thus free
from 10(b)(5)'s reach. Part II transitions into an overview of the CDS
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2011).
12. Id.
13. See 17 C.F.R § 240.14e-3 (2010).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
15. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2010).
16. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j (LexisNexis 2011).
2011]
534 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:531
market which, combined with Part I, lays an analytic foundation upon
which Part III's discussion of CDS insider trading regulation builds.
II. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
The lending arena entered an era of transformation in the early
1990s. Creditors recognized they were needlessly assuming all the risk
of debtor default. The idea of spreading lending risk among parties
besides the creditor emerged as a viable, legal, win-win alternative
and credit default swaps were the vehicle that made the idea a reality.
A credit default swap is a type of credit derivative 17 that spreads
risk among parties in ways similar to insurance contracts. In a CDS, a
"protection buyer" contracts with a "protection seller," who agrees to
compensate the protection buyer if a designated reference asset ex-
periences a "credit triggering event." The credit triggering event is
usually the default of the reference asset. For example, protection
buyer X, wanting to hedge some of the risk it assumes by lending to Y,
transacts a CDS with protection seller Z. If the credit triggering event
occurs, Z must compensate X for all or part of its loss, depending on
the terms of the CDS. In exchange for assuming this risk, Z receives a
periodically paid premium from X.18
A. The Value CDSs Provide
Shortly after their inception in the early 1990s, CDSs rapidly blos-
somed into an immensely popular financial instrument, exceeding
$450 trillion in notional value by mid-2009.1 9 CDSs benefit individual
market participants because they "increase[ ] the range of financial
products available to corporations and investors and foster[ ] more
17. Some types of credit derivatives are considered over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. A
derivative is labeled OTC when it is not traded on any centralized exchange. As part of its
response to the financial crisis, the SEC sought to reduce some of the risks and harms associated
with OTC trading by approving designated entities (e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange) to serve
as central counterparties (CCPs) for credit derivatives. CCPs help reduce some of the risk of
OTC trading by providing some of the functions a centralized exchange provides, such as substi-
tuting the liquidity of the CCP for the liquidity of the counterparties to a CDS. Nevertheless, as
of the date of this paper's submission, no true centralized exchange for credit derivatives yet
exists. See Granting Temporary Exemptions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59578, 2009 SEC
LEXIS 737 (Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.see.gov/rules/exorders/2009/34-59578.pdf.
18. See Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds
and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095, 3097 (2008).
19. See Hearing to Review Proposed Legislation by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Re-
garding the Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets: Before the H. Comm. on Agric.
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary Schapiro, SEC Chairman), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-lllhhrg53020/html/CHRG-lllhhrg53020.htm.
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precise ways of understanding, quantifying and managing risk." 20
CDSs mitigate the sudden and intense blows of debtor default that
often push lenders into failure. By enabling lenders to spread the
debtor's default risk among several parties, rather than shouldering
that risk alone, CDSs permit lenders to make more loans.21
CDSs also benefit the market collectively because they reduce sys-
temic risk.22 Systemic risk23 is the notion that "a trigger event, such as
an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad eco-
nomic consequences- sometimes referred to as a domino effect. 2
4
Systemic risk theory posits that these domino effects, if not contained
20. The President's Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Over-the-Counter Deriva-
tives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act: Before the S. Comm. on Risk Mgmt., Research
and Specialty Crops on the H. Comm. on Agric., 106th Cong. 15 (2000) (statement of Lee Sachs,
Assistant Secretary for the Financial Markets, U.S. Department of Treasury), available at http://
commdocs.house.gov/committees/ag/hag10643.000/hag10643_0f.htm; see generally John D. Fin-
nerty & Mark S. Brown, An Overview of Derivatives Litigation, 1994 to 2000, 7 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 131, 146 (2001); Lily Tijoe, Note, Credit Derivatives: Regulatory Challenges in an
Exploding Industry, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 387, 394 (2007) ("[C]redit derivatives
allow different parties in the market to calibrate their portfolios to accommodate varying appe-
tites for credit risk."). To illustrate: suppose a market participant enters into a financial transac-
tion where the risk could be anywhere from twenty to thirty units (arbitrary numbers). The
highly customized nature of the CDS allows the trader to know with much greater certainty the
exact level of risk she is assuming (say twenty-eight units). The trader can now seek out specific
ways to hedge a risk of twenty-eight units. This certainty increases the chances that the trader
will hedge the CDS risk correctly, which in turn decreases the risk involved with the initial CDS
transaction.
21. See infra note 26 (describing how CDSs reduce the burden lenders shoulder when a de-
fault does occur). The CDS's ability to decrease the overall risk a lender assumes for any given
loan enables the lender to make more loans.
22. Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 220 ("Derivatives used for hedging ... actually reduce the
potential for systemic risk .... The most widely used derivative instrument for this purpose is
the credit-default swap.").
23. AIG's bailout is widely believed to be a governmental effort to reduce systemic risk. See
Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer's Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28fbusiness/28melt.html.
24. Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 198.
The classic example of systemic risk in this context is a "bank run," in which the inabil-
ity of a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn causing other
banks or their creditors to fail. The original failure can occur when depositors panic,
converging on the bank to quickly withdraw their monies. Because banks keep only a
small fraction of their deposits on hand as cash reserves, a bank may have insufficient
cash to pay all withdrawal-demands, causing it to default and ultimately fail. The chain
of subsequent failures can occur because banks are closely intertwined financially.
They lend to and borrow from each other, hold deposit balances with each other ....
Because of this interconnectedness, one bank's default on an obligation to another may
adversely affect that other bank's ability to meet its obligation to yet other banks, and
"so on down chain of banks and beyond."
Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
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early, may put entire markets at risk of collapse.25 Former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted,
Historically, banks have been at the forefront of financial interme-
diation, in part because their ability to leverage offered an efficient
source of funding. But too often in periods of severe financial
stress, such leverage brought down numerous, previously vaunted
banking institutions, and precipitated a financial crisis that led to
recession or worse. But recent regulatory reform coupled with in-
novative technologies has spawned rapidly growing markets . . .
credit default swaps .... The new instruments of risk dispersal have
enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks in their credit-
granting role to divest themselves of much credit risk by passing it
to institutions with far less leverage.2 6
B. The CDS Market's Vulnerability to Insider Trading and
Associated Harms
While they provide significant value to the market, CDSs are also
highly susceptible of insider trading27 and associated harms. Specifi-
cally, if protection buyer X has material, non-public information about
reference asset Y, or can itself influence Y's credit triggering event, X
has incentive to exploit this information to the detriment of less-in-
formed protection sellers. Similarly, loan officers of a bank may pass
on information to protection buyers who are not themselves creditors
to the reference asset, arguably defrauding the CDS counterparties of
these protection buyers. For at least three reasons, CDS markets are
ripe for insider trading and other associated harms deserving special
attention: (1) Most of the players in the CDS market are insiders; (2)
CDSs create moral hazards that increase the damage caused by in-
sider trading; and (3) the CDS market is highly opaque and CDSs only
recently have been traded on regulated exchanges. The next sections
discuss each in turn.
25. See id.
26. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the HM Treasury Enterprise
Conference in London, England: Economic Flexibility (Jan. 26, 2004), Before the HM Treasury
Enterprise Conference, London, England (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BoardDocs/speeches/2004/20040126/default.htm. As an example of the concept described
above, Greenspan noted that credit derivatives served as a shock absorber during Enron and
WorldCom crises. Because their creditors had so effectively hedged themselves through CDSs,
Enron and WorldCom's colossal bankruptcies did not overly disrupt the market. See Frank A.
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., Symposium, Debt as a Lever of Control: The Promise and Peril of
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (2007).
27. See Viral Acharya & Timothy Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives (Sept. 2005)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
767864) (empirical study showing significant insider trading presence in credit derivative
markets).
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1. More Material, Non-Public Information is Disclosed in Lending
Relationships than in Equity Relationships
Firms using both debt and equity financing tend to maintain closer
relationships with their lenders than with their investors. 28 Lending
relationships often require borrowers to provide to their lenders mate-
rial information, including revenue projections, merger and acquisi-
tion plans, and other price-sensitive information well before the public
obtains that information. 29 Lenders use this information to quote
CDS prices to potential protection sellers, a responsibility which often
falls on the lender's trading desk.30 As Professors Acharya and John-
son note, "[I]n the absence of perfect 'Chinese walls' within banks, the
credit derivatives market provides the trading desks ... a trading
mechanism through which the information possessed by loan officers
about a firm can be exploited, and, in turn, transmitted in public
markets. "31
Further lubricating the insider trading wheels is the fact that nearly
all CDSs on the market are held by a very small number of large insti-
tutional traders. The same ten lenders are participating in nearly two-
thirds of all CDS transactions,32 and each of these lenders has access
to material, non-public information for each of their CDSs. CDS mar-
kets break with securities markets in this aspect. Unlike securities
markets, in which few market players have access to inside informa-
tion, nearly every CDS player has access to inside information.
2. CDS Moral Hazards Increase Harms Caused by Insider Trading
At their core, CDSs are insurance contracts; like all insurance con-
tracts, CDSs create moral hazards.33 A CDS's ability to compensate a
lender for the loss it incurs as a result of borrower default causes that
borrower to reevaluate its interests as the lending relationship pro-
gresses. In some scenarios, lenders may find it more financially ad-
vantageous to collect from the protection seller than from the
borrower,34 and so may actually hope for the lender's default.35 Thus,
28. See id. at 3.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Tijoe, supra note 20, at 404 n.146-49.
33. Gregory R. Duffee & Chunsheng Zhou, Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful Tools for
Managing Risk?, 48 J. MONETARY ECON., 25, 25-53, (2001).
34. See Gregory Plotko, The Impact of Credit Default Swaps on the Chapter 11 Process, 18 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 (2009) ("The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that creditors will act in their
own self-interest to participate constructively and rationally in the restructuring process and will
2011]
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in some scenarios, CDSs are incentivizing creditors and other protec-
tion buyers to destroy value in reference entities. 36
In an example describing the most extreme version of CDS moral
hazard, Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO), the largest
bond investor in the U.S., recorded several cases of CDS insider trad-
ing exploiting large firms such as Household International Inc., AT&T
Wireless, and Sprint. Indeed, when used unethically, credit default
swaps become "a mechanism with which friendly commercial bankers
... can profit by betraying and destroying their clients through the use
of inside information," and "firms with large lending departments
would always come in and buy protection at exactly the right
moment." 37
A less extreme example of CDS moral hazard involved a 2004 lend-
ing arrangement with J.P. Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and several
hedge funds serving as creditors for a $580 million loan to Tower Au-
tomotive (Tower). 38 As Tower's financial position declined, it sought
to refinance and asked for additional loans to free up collateral. 39 Al-
though J.P. Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley cooperated, presuma-
bly doing so to help Tower avoid default, the hedge funds flatly
rejected the request.40
Wall Street rumor currents suggested the hedge funds had short-
sold Tower's stock. 41 Sophisticated financial models created a scenario
where the profits Tower would gain from the shorted stock were
greater than those they would gain from a continued lending relation-
ship with Tower.42 CDS trading records are too inaccessible to con-
firm that the hedge funds had purchased CDS protection for their
favor a bankruptcy filing only if they expect to receive more in a bankruptcy than in an out-of-
court workout.") (citation omitted).
35. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting I:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 732 (2008) (describing how CDS-backed
creditors no longer have the same incentives to work toward their borrowers' reorganization and
may even contribute to a borrower's decline); see also Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets
Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 42 (2009) ("[T]he
underlying sentiment [of lenders] was why worry about the possibility of loan defaults if credit-
default swaps were available.").
36. See Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 405, 419 (2007).
37. Pass the Parcel-Grumbles in the Booming Market for Credit Derivatives, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 16, 2003, available at http://www.economist.com/node/1537500.
38. See Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 26, at 1034.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1034-35.
42. See id.
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Tower loans.43 However, if they did, the incentive to destroy Tower's
value may have been irresistible.44 Not only would the hedge funds
have profited from their short sale, they would have received addi-
tional compensation from their CDS. With such a reward hinging
upon its borrower's decline, some market players might take affirma-
tive measures to accelerate it.
Still less extreme examples of CDS moral hazard involve CDS-
hedged lenders who, though not taking affirmative steps to destroy a
borrower, disregard implied, but unenforced, duties to assist in their
borrower's revival. Such was the case when Enron defaulted in 2001.
Market watchers noted that its lenders were mysteriously uninvolved
and seemingly uninterested in Enron's decline. 45 Observers later
learned Enron's creditors had effectively used CDSs to hedge them-
selves against Enron's failure; thus the creditors had little interest in
Enron's survival or assisting in its restructure, as creditors typically do
and should.46
CDS insider trading is an issue ripe for discussion because of the
CDS market's opacity, its absence of regulation, and the significant
flow of material, non-public information that occurs in lending rela-
tionships. CDS moral hazards further the discussion by illustrating
that, regardless of whether CDS insider trading is itself a harmful
practice, it incentivizes additional market-destroying behavior. When
a creditor receives compensation for the default of its borrowers, and
the creditor possesses inside information about the borrower's finan-
cial situation, the creditor may at times have incentive to use that in-
side information to contribute manipulatively to the borrower's
decline.
3. CDS Markets are Highly Opaque and Have Only Recently
Been Traded on Regulated Exchanges.
To promote product innovation and growth, Congress explicitly ex-
cluded OTC derivatives from the securities regulatory framework in
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.47 A recent study
of CDSs by the Government Accountability Office found that "com-
prehensive and consistent data on the overall market have not been
43. See id.
44. For protection buyers who are not simultaneously serving as the lender to the reference
asset, the moral hazard may reach still higher levels.
45. See Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 26.
46. See id.
47. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-2 (LexisNexis 2011)) (exempting all over-the-
counter derivatives, which includes CDSs, from regulation).
20111
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readily available," that "authoritative information about the actual
size of the market i generally not available" and that regulators are
currently unable to monitor activities across the market. 48 An ab-
sence of regulation allows CDS market players to exploit informa-
tional advantages in a way prohibited in securities markets.
C. SEC v. Rorech
The facts giving rise to SEC v. Rorech began when VNU,49 a Dutch
media holding company, employed Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
(DBSI) as an underwriter for its public bond offerings. 50 VNU regu-
larly offered CDSs that used VNU bonds as the reference asset.5 1
From July 12th to July 24th, 2006, DBSI allegedly encouraged VNU to
issue additional bonds, leading to VNU's announcement of an addi-
tional public bond issuance on July 24th, 2006.52
In Rorech, the SEC alleged that the issuance of these new bonds
materially affected the price of previously issued VNU CDSs. Ac-
cording to the SEC, a trader in possession of VNU CDSs before the
July 24th announcement enjoyed a significant price and value increase
in her CDSs after the announcement. Surely enough, the price of
VNU CDSs did significantly increase after the July 24th
announcement. 53
DBSI employed Paul Rorech as a bond and CDS salesman. The
SEC alleged that between July 14th and July 17th, 2006, Rorech
tipped off Renato Negrin, a manager for a hedge fund investment ad-
visor, about the upcoming VNU bond issuance. 54 On July 17th and
July 18th, 2006, Negrin purchased two VNU CDSs, allegedly basing
his purchase decision on Rorech's tip.55 Sometime after the July 24th
announcement, Negrin sold his CDS for a profit of approximately $1.2
million.56
On May 11th, 2009, the SEC brought suit in United States District
Court, Southern District of New York, against both Rorech and
48. Systemic Risk: Regulatory Oversight and Recent Initiatives to Address Risk Posed by
Credit Default Swaps: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Spon-
sored Enter. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Orice M. Wil-
liams, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S. Gov't Accountability
Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09397t.pdf.
49. VNU is the actual name of the company and is not an acronym.
50. SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
51. Id. at 378.
52. Id. at 382.
53. Id. at 387.
54. Id. at 383.
55. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
56. Id. at 383.
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Negrin. The SEC's complaint accused both Rorech and Negrin of vio-
lating Section 10(b) of the Securities Act.57 Both defendants argued
that their trades were outside of the 10(b) scope because they were
not securities-based swap agreements; the SEC therefore lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to pursue the case.58 Rorech further argued
that even if he traded on material, non-public information, he still was
not in violation of 10(b)'s insider trading proscription because he had
no duty to keep information about the VNU bonds confidential. 59
Rorech provides the first judicial response to CDS insider trading
and, in doing so, breaks ground on what promises to be a fruitful new
area of judicial and scholarly analysis. The Rorech court had three
primary options in deciding the case. First, it could have ruled that a
CDS is not a securities-based swap agreement. Such a holding would
have dismissed the SEC's complaint because, in the pre-Dodd-Frank
regulatory landscape, the only viable avenue for regulating CDS was
through 10(b); and 10(b) is only operative in securities-based swap
agreements.
A second option available to the court was to rule that CDSs are
securities-based swap agreements, while also holding that CDS traders
are nevertheless free from 10(b) liability because they possess no fidu-
ciary duty to either disclose material, non-public information or re-
frain from trading. Again, such a holding would have dismissed the
SEC's complaint. Absent a fiduciary duty to disclose material, non-
public information, 10(b)'s reach would not extend to CDS insider
trading.
The Rorech court chose the third and most analysis-rich option by
holding that CDSs are security-based swap agreements while also
holding that CDS traders have a fiduciary duty to disclose material,
non-public information or refrain from trading.60 Because the court
found that neither Rorech nor Negrin possessed the necessary inside
information to qualify as true "insiders," both defendants escaped lia-
bility entirely. The court's holding nevertheless sweeps CDS insider
trading into SEC jurisdiction. It also requires courts, Congress, and
administrative agencies to craft a new rule of exactly what the fiduci-
ary duty in CDS markets entails. 61
57. Id. at 370.
58. Id. at 404.
59. Id. at 408-13.
60. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
61. If the history of insider trading in securities markets is any predictor, defining a fiduciary
duty in CDS markets will be no easy task. The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with
fiduciary duties in securities markets was United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The rule
set forth in O'Hagan has been highly criticized. See, e.g., M. Breen Haire, The Uneasy Doctrinal
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III. SHOULD INSIDER TRADING IN CDS MARKETS
BE REGULATED?
As described in Part I, scholars, market participants, and lawmakers
alike have hotly contested insider trading regulation in securities mar-
kets. A congressional reluctance to statutorily ban all trading on ma-
terial, non-public information has led to three separate eras of
judicially created insider trading regulation, each producing a unique
collection of awkward, inconsistent results. 62 With Rorech, the CDS
market now embarks on its own journey through the puzzling world of
insider trading regulation, and undoubtedly will face many of the
same challenges securities markets have faced. Part III assesses
whether CDS insider trading should be regulated. It first analyzes
how arguments that favor insider trading in securities markets apply
to CDS markets. It then argues why an insider trading prohibition in
CDS markets, as in securities markets, is sound policy.
A. Weighing Insider Trading Deregulation Arguments in Securities
Markets and Analyzing their Applicability to CDSs
Deregulators (those who oppose insider trading regulation) have
set forth the following arguments: (1) Insider trading increases pricing
efficiency; 63 (2) those suffering losses from trading with insiders would
have suffered the same losses had inside trading regulations been in
place;64 (3) insider trading improves the agent/principal relationship.65
1. Increased Pricing Efficiency
Deregulators argue that insider trading leads to greater pricing effi-
ciency in securities markets by bringing the security's price closer to
the price it would be if the inside information was publicly known. 66
More accurate pricing leads to more efficient allocation of resources.
Assuming the argument is cogent67 it is likely even more persuasive in
CDS markets.
Compromise of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1251 (1998); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1491 (1999). See infra Part III(C)(3) for further discussion.
62. Part III(C) analyzes each of these eras in detail.
63. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 866-68.
64. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 41(1991 ed.).
65. See Manne, supra note 5, at 111-58.
66. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 866-68.
67. Lynn Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988) (criticizing thoroughly this
argument).
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As noted above, parties disclose more material, non-public informa-
tion in lending relationships than in equity relationships. Addition-
ally, the CDS market is highly institutionally concentrated. 68 These
facts combine to make the CDS market much more "inside" than se-
curities markets. Most of the players in the CDS market are insiders
with ready access to inside information. Thus, at an even greater pace
than in securities markets, trading in the CDS market with material,
non-public information arguably leads to increased pricing efficiency.
2. Those Suffering Losses from Trading with Insiders Would
Have Suffered the Same Losses Had Insider Trading
Regulation Been in Place
Perhaps the most oft used argument by regulators (those favoring
insider trading regulation), and discussed more below, is the funda-
mental unfairness of trading with asymmetric information. 69 Absent
regulation, insiders inevitably will profit at the expense of less-in-
formed outsiders. However, if regulation's goal is to protect the
outside trader, a ban on insider trading is not necessarily an effective
means of accomplishing this goal. Had regulations barred the insider
from trading, the outsider who would have traded with that insider
will find another outsider with whom to make its intended trade, and
subsequently suffer the same loss it would have suffered had it traded
with the insider.
This argument assumes, however, that the absence of inside traders
would not affect the outsider's trading decision. If there are a suffi-
cient number of insiders who would have traded with material, non-
public information, but who are now regulatorily barred from making
those trades, there will be fewer traders of that security, thus changing
its price. The changed price may affect the less-informed trader's
decision.
As noted above, insider trading activity in CDS markets creates
even greater price shifts because insiders make up a greater portion of
total traders than insiders in securities markets. Unlike in securities
markets, there are fewer CDS outsiders whose trading activity can di-
68. As Tijoe notes,
The "$12.4 trillion market for credit derivatives is dominated by too few banks, making
it vulnerable to a crisis if one of them fails to pay on contracts that insure creditors from
companies defaulting." Ten of the top firms on Wall Street hold more than two-thirds
of credit default swaps. A default in a major dealer or investment manager in the credit
derivatives market may harm the market overall and worsen credit derivatives'
liquidity.
Tijoe, supra note 20, at 404 (citations omitted).
69. See infra note 86, for further discussion.
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lute the price-changing effects of insiders' trading activity. Thus, the
argument that those suffering losses by trading with insiders would
have suffered the same loss in the absence of insider trading loses
some of its steam in the CDS market. In the CDS market, it is less
certain that outsiders would have made their same ill-fated trades with
insider trading regulations in place.
Decreased liquidity in CDS markets further weakens the argu-
ment.70 As noted in Part II(A) & (B), CDSs are highly customized
and have only recently been traded on centralized exchanges; this in
turn poses liquidity problems. Unlike in public securities markets,
where traders are generally able to immediately find a counterparty
for their desired trade, CDS traders are not always so fortunate.
To illustrate how decreased liquidity is relevant in this context, con-
sider the following example: CDS trader X intends to use material,
non-public information and enter into a CDS transaction with
counterparty Y. Because of its informational advantage, X will likely
profit at Y's expense. However, if regulation prohibits X from enter-
ing into the transaction, deregulators would argue that Y will find an-
other counterparty and make the same transaction it would have
made with X. However, the decreased liquidity in the CDS market
might prevent Y from finding that counterparty. In such case, the in-
sider trading ban effectively prevented Y's loss.
3. Agency Arguments
Commentators have set forth several arguments asserting that in-
sider trading improves the principal/agent relationship. 71 None of
these arguments applies to CDSs because no principal/agent relation-
ship is currently recognized in a CDS transaction. None of the parties
in a CDS transaction-protection buyer, protection seller, reference
asset-serves in any formally recognized agency capacity.7
2
70. In Part III(B)(2) below, I argue that a CDS insider trading prohibition would benefit the
CDS market by increasing its liquidity. Such increased liquidity, I recognize, would return some
of the force of the deregulators' argument in III(A)(2). Public policy is a battle of tradeoffs. I
do not believe the added force that increased liquidity would provide to III(A)(2)'s deregulation
argument sufficiently trumps the other benefits of increased liquidity a CDS insider trading pro-
hibition would engender.
71. See MANNE, supra note 5, at 111-58.
72. In Section III(D) I argue that a principal/agent relationship should exist between a bor-
rower and a protection buyer; however, I also argue that CDS insider trading by a protection
buyer constitutes an egregious breach of this fiduciary relationship-nothing like the improve-
ments the deregulators claim would occur in the securities markets if the insider trading prohibi-
tion was lifted.
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B. Why an Insider Trading Prohibition in CDS Markets is
Sound Policy
Similar to securities markets, an insider trading prohibition in CDS
markets would (1) promote confidence in financial markets; (2) in-
crease liquidity and (3) decrease the moral hazard associated with in-
sider trading.
1. Promoting Confidence in Financial Markets
Confidence in financial markets is low. 73 Fairness is a fundamental
precept of a financial market in which the public can have confi-
dence. 74 Momentarily placing economic and legal arguments aside,
something simply "feels" wrong about corporate insiders profiting at
the expense of those who do not have, and cannot obtain, the same
information the insider has. Though the author is unaware of any em-
pirical study proving that insider trading deters market participation,
the anecdotal evidence is arguably sufficient. Human nature is to
avoid games where one's opponent has stacked the deck unevenly in
one's favor. Because CDSs are of great economic benefit, a public
perception of CDS market fairness is of great import.
Similar to a fair marketplace, a consistent marketplace earns public
respect and confidence. Consistency is highly applicable to CDSs be-
cause, while CDS insider trading is similar to securities insider trading,
only the latter is regulated. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro recently
commented on the undesirability of inconsistently regulating similar
financial products and practices: "A basic tenet of functional regula-
tion ... is to have a regulatory regime under which similar products
and activities should be subject to similar regulations and oversight. '75
"[R]egulatory arbitrage[] possibilities abound when economically
equivalent alternatives are subject to different regulatory regimes. An
73. See Steven Russolillo, US Stocks Drop as Consumer Confidence Falls, Fed Minutes on
Tap, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110830-
709744.html.
74. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("[A]n animating purpose of the
Exchange Act [is] to insure honest securities markets, thereby promoting investor confidence.");
Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Mar-
ket, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1439 (1967) (expounding upon fairness as paramount priority in a
functional financial market).
75. See Modernizing the Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Insti-
tutions that Participate in these Markets: Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 48 (2009) (statement of Mary
Schapiro, SEC Chairman), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg54589/pdf/
CHRG-111shrg54589.pdf.
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individual market participant can have incentives to migrate to prod-
ucts that are subject to lighter regulatory oversight. '76
2. Achieving Increased Liquidity
Public confidence in the market, and the increased market partici-
pation that occurs as a result, leads to increased liquidity. Currently,
the CDS market suffers from institutional concentration, a term that
refers to a small number of participants dominating a specific mar-
ket.77 Institutional concentration can cause significant liquidity
problems. Because the CDS market participants share liabilities, se-
curity and derivative ownership, and other financial dealings with one
another, each participant's success in part hinges on the success of the
other players.78 If one participant begins to fail, each of the other
market participants becomes vulnerable as well.
With so few institutions dominating the market, the failure of even
one significantly affects the liquidity of the market collectively. Sev-
eral institutional failures in a short period of time can lead to a liquid-
ity crisis of market-destroying magnitude. The risk of such
phenomena occurring is referred to as "systemic risk"-the concept
that "a trigger event," 79 such as an economic shock or institutional
failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences-sometimes re-
ferred to as a "domino effect." 80
The role American International Group (AIG) played in the 2008
financial crisis illustrates these principles in action. AIG had entered
into complex webs of CDSs that it used to hedge the risks of $441
billion worth of mortgage-backed securities,81 $58 billion of which in-
volved sub-prime loans.82 As the value of these sub-prime loans tum-
bled, AIG's credit rating was downgraded, causing many of its
76. See Hearing to Review Proposed Legislation by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Re-
garding the Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets: Before the H. Comm. on Agric.
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary Schapiro, SEC Chairman), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg53020/htmlICHRG-111hhrg53020.htm
77. See supra note 68.
78. See Tijoe, supra note 20, at 404 nn.146-49.
79. "Trigger event" in this context does not necessarily mean triggering events in relation to a
CDS. Though a CDS triggering event can be the start of systemic collapse, there are many other
triggering events that could also play this role.
80. Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 198.
81. A mortgage-backed-security (MBS) is a type of asset-backed security that is secured by a
mortgage or a collection of mortgages. Investing in MBSs is essentially lending money to a
home buyer or business and betting on the borrower paying it off, for which the investor will
then reap a return.
82. See Michael de la Merced & Gretchen Morgenson, A.LG. Allowed to Borrow Money from
Subsidiaries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/
business/15aig.html?hp.
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counterparties to demand it to post collateral.8 3 Obtaining that collat-
eral in the complex web of CDSs in which AIG had entangled itself
caused a liquidity crisis that, but for a federal bailout, would likely
have led to its bankruptcy.8 4
Preventing AIG's failure, of itself, was not likely a sufficient reason
to expend hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. Rather, the
heightened liquidity problems and the accompanying systemic risk the
remainder of the market would have borne had AIG failed led gov-
ernment decision-makers to conclude its bailout was justified.8 5 Re-
ducing institutional concentration in the CDS market is one
preventative to liquidity and systemic crises. More widely spread par-
ticipation in any market increases its liquidity. To at least some de-
gree, increased participation in the CDS market depends on public
perceptions of its fairness and consistency. Regulating CDS insider
trading is one way to increase fairness and consistency, thereby broad-
ening CDS market participation and preventing the liquidity and sys-
temic catastrophes like those of September 2008.
3. Reducing Moral Hazards
Insider trading in securities markets creates a moral hazard by al-
lowing managers to profit from their firm's decline.8 6 Managers trad-
83. Collateral refers to properties or assets that are offered to secure a loan or other credit.
Collateral becomes subject to seizure on default; upon learning that a debtor has experienced
significant financial decline, creditors may demand debtors to "post" collateral, or offer evidence
to the creditor of the assets the debtor has available should it default.
84. See de la Merced, & Morgenson, supra note 82.
85. The following excerpt depicts the scene surrounding AIG's near collapse and justification
for its bailout.
As the group, led by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., pondered the collapse of
one of America's oldest investment banks, Lehman Brothers, a more dangerous threat
emerged: American International Group, the world's largest insurer, was teetering.
A.I.G. needed billions of dollars to right itself and had suddenly begged for help. One
of the Wall Street chief executives participating in the meeting was Lloyd C. Blankfein
of Goldman Sachs, Mr. Paulson's former firm. Mr. Blankfein had particular reason for
concern. Although it was not widely known, Goldman, a Wall Street stalwart that had
seemed immune to its rivals' woes, was A.I.G.'s largest trading partner, according to six
people close to the insurer who requested anonymity because of confidentiality agree-
ments. A collapse of the insurer threatened to leave a hole of as much as $20 billion in
Goldman's side, several of these people said. Days later, federal officials, who had let
Lehman die and initially balked at tossing a lifeline to A.I.G., ended up bailing out the
insurer for $85 billion. Their message was simple: Lehman was expendable. But if
A.I.G. unspooled, so could some of the mightiest enterprises in the world.
Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html.
86. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts,
68 VA. L. REv. 117, 149 (1982) (describing how insider trading allows managers to profit from
their firm's decline).
548 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
ing with material, non-public information have incentive to destroy
value in their firms and reap personal gain by short selling the firm's
stock. CDSs suffer from a similar moral hazard, which Part II(B)(2)
introduced and this Part readdresses. Consider the following straight-
forward example: Creditor X learns material, non-public information
about the financial condition of one of its borrowers, Y. Because the
information is negative, X seeks CDS protection and enters into a
CDS transaction with protection seller Z.
As Y's financial condition declines, X may find the payout of the
CDS more favorable than the payout of a continued lending relation-
ship with Y. X may subsequently take measures to ensure Y's failure,
most likely by refusing to assist in or by manipulating Y's restructur-
ing. In an action closely resembling securities market moral hazard, X
may even short Y's stock in effort to manipulatively drive its price
down, further facilitating Y's downward slide.
A ban on CDS insider trading would shrink the CDS moral hazard.
If regulations barred X from trading with material, non-public infor-
mation, it would have been unable to purchase the CDS protection at
the time it did because the purchase utilized material, non-public in-
formation. If X desires CDS protection for its loan to Y, regulation
would force X to purchase this protection without the assistance of
material, non-public information in its possession. A CDS insider
trading ban thus forces X to bargain with symmetrical information or
not come to the bargaining table at all. Being unable to lawfully
purchase a CDS, X loses its incentive to destroy value in Y and in-
stead returns to the traditional, more constructive role of assisting in
Y's revival.
Notably, an insider trading ban would not abolish X's incentive to
destroy value in all circumstances. X may still purchase CDSs, so long
as the exchange occurs with symmetrical information. Once in posses-
sion of a CDS, X's incentive to destroy Y's value returns. The insider
trading ban makes this scenario less likely, however, because it en-
sures X bargains with symmetrical information. When Z possesses the
same information X possesses, Z likely will not sell protection to X
unless Y is in good financial health. The insider trading ban would
thus prevent those scenarios mentioned in Part II(B)(2) in which a
protection buyer, utilizing insider information, sabotages its reference
asset and buys CDS protection at just the right time. But whenever a
protection buyer succeeds in purchasing protection, from that point
forward an insider trading ban's ability to curb CDS moral hazards is
exhausted.
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C. The Case Law Governing Insider Trading in Securities Markets
Turning now from insider trading regulation policy arguments, this
subsection analyzes CDS insider trading regulation through case law
already established in securities markets. Courts have struggled to
craft rules that sufficiently capture the harms of insider trading while
not intruding upon the efficient function of securities markets. In-
deed, the notion that one can obtain and then use information other
market participants may not possess is a driving force in investment
professions. 87 To determine which kind of asymmetrical information
use is permissible, courts have constructed three major rules of insider
trading regulation: The Equal Access Model of Liability, the Fiduciary
Model of Liability, and the Misappropriation Model of liability. This
subpart explains each model in turn.
1. The Equal Access Model of Liability (1961-1981)
The Equal Access Model originated in the Second Circuit case SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulfur.8 8 In that case, a mining company discovered a
copper-rich field in Canada. The company was silent about the find-
ings in its quarterly reports, however, while company insiders pur-
chased high volumes of the firm's stock.89 Surely enough, the value of
the stock soared after the company disclosed the discovery publicly,
and the insiders reaped huge capital gains.90
Texas Gulf Sulfur stood for the proposition that the Exchange Act
required parity of information access among all traders in public se-
curities markets. While not all traders must actually possess the same
information, they must have equal access to it.91 One commentator
has argued that "the logic of the disclose-or-refrain rule theory pre-
cludes exploitation of an informational advantage that the public is
unable lawfully to overcome or offset."'92 The Equal Access Model
never gained serious credibility, making it no surprise when the Su-
87. See Charles C. Cox & Kevin Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 353,
354 (1988) ("A prohibition that discourages the use other than that already discovered necessa-
rily discourages the discovery of new information and inhibits the use of information whose
public or nonpublic status is uncertain."); M. Breen Haire, The Uneasy Doctrinal Compromise of
the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1261 (1998)
(noting that a rule that requires all non-public information to be disclosed or not traded upon
may "stifle the efforts of financial analysts to bring information to the markets").
88. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
89. Id. at 846-47.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 848.
92. Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 360 (1979).
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preme Court overruled it and ushered in a new era of insider trading
law.
2. The Fiduciary Duty Model of Liability (1980-1998)
In the late 1970s, Vincent Chiarella, as part of his duties as an em-
ployee of the prominent financial printing firm Pandick Press, was re-
sponsible for readying for print news releases for which financial firms
had retained Pandick to distribute publicly.93 Sensing the value of the
information passing through his hands each day, Chiarella began to
study the releases and soon learned to identify firms that were
targeted for mergers and acquisitions. 94 Chiarella purchased stock in
these firms before the news of the merger or acquisition became pub-
lic, and reaped lucrative gains as a result.95 Shortly thereafter, the
SEC charged Chiarella with seventeen counts of violating sections
10(b) and rule 10(b)(5) and successfully convicted him on each of
them. Adhering strictly to the Equal Access Model of liability, the
Second Circuit affirmed. 96
In its first case directly confronting the Equal Access Model, the
Supreme Court reversed all seventeen counts of Chiarella's convic-
tions.97 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell emphasized that 10(b)
is foremost an antifraud provision, and "one who fails to disclose ma-
terial information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits
fraud only when he is under a duty to do so."98 That duty, Justice
Powell continued, only arises when "the other [party] is entitled to
know [the information] because of a fiduciary duty or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them." 99
Chiarella, who, as an employee of Pandick, owed no fiduciary duty
to the shareholders of the companies targeted for merger and acquisi-
tion, could not have defrauded them. Justice Blackmun's dissent,
which argued on behalf of the equal access theory, was promptly dis-
missed by the majority as an attempt to recognize "a general duty
between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based
on material, nonpublic information." The majority further reasoned
that
[f]ormulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from the
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship be-
93. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 225.
96. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
97. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225.
98. Id. at 228.
99. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
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tween two parties.., should not be undertaken absent some explicit
evidence of congressional intent .... [N]either Congress nor the
Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule. 100
3. The Misappropriation Model of Liability (1998-present)
While the rule set forth in Chiarella was based on sound fiduciary
reasoning, it produced illogical results. Absent some other provision
imposing liability, those who obtain inside information, but who are
not fiduciaries in the firm (e.g. officers and others with similar control
over the firm's functions) to whom the inside information pertains,
may lawfully trade with that information. However, had those same
traders been fiduciaries in the firm, they would be squarely in viola-
tion of Section 10(b). Is there any meaningful distinction between the
two scenarios? The Misappropriation Model,101 adopted in the 1997
case United States v. O'Hagan,10 2 declares there is not and continues
to govern insider trading regulation in securities markets today.
O'Hagan dealt with an attorney, defendant O'Hagan, who worked
for a law firm retained by Grand Met PLC to assist with an upcoming
acquisition of the Pillsbury Company. 10 3 Although O'Hagan was not
part of the legal team working on the acquisition, he learned of the
matter before it was disclosed publicly, and profited $4 million by us-
ing that knowledge in strategically timed trades of large volumes of
Pillsbury stock.104
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit
and convicted O'Hagan on fifty-seven counts of mail fraud, money
laundering and securities fraud.105 The O'Hagan Court broke sharply
with Chiarella reasoning by accepting the government's argument that
O'Hagan breached a fiduciary duty he owed to the source of the infor-
mation, rather than to the person with whom he traded.10 6 By ex-
panding the scope of a trader's fiduciary duty to include the source
from which he obtained the information, the Court was able to catch
O'Hagan within 10(b)'s net, a ruling not possible under strict Chiarella
reasoning. Post-O'Hagan, 10(b) thus condemns "insiders" trading
100. Id. at 233.
101. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger laid the
foundation for the Misappropriation Model of Liability. Condemning Chiarella's actions as vio-
lations of 10(b)'s antifraud provisions, Burger asserted that any trader who obtains material,
non-public information "not by superior experience, foresight, or industry" has acted unlawfully.
Id.
102. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
103. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1996).
104. Id.
105. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
106. Id. at 651.
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with inside information because the insider breached a fiduciary duty
to shareholders; it also condemns "outsiders" trading with inside in-
formation because the outsider breached a fiduciary duty to the
source of the information. 0 7
D. Applying Insider Trading Case Law in Securities
Markets to CDSs
Several principles from the three models described above are appli-
cable to CDS insider trading regulation. Perhaps foremost, the judi-
cial distaste and accompanying congressional acquiescence for the
Equal Access Model make it unlikely that it or any other "duty-less"
model will survive as a CDS insider trading regulatory mechanism.
Thus, effective CDS regulation will attach some kind of fiduciary duty
to users of material, non-public information in CDS markets.
However, on first glance, the policy argument for imposing fiduci-
ary duties into CDS markets is not particularly strong. Repeat trans-
actions govern institutionally concentrated markets like the current
CDS market. As one commentator has noted, "when parties expect
to have repeated transactions, the risk of self-dealing by one party is
constrained by the threat that the other party will punish the cheating
party in the future.1108 Protection buyers who abuse their counterpar-
ties will find that such actions come back to haunt them when they
wish to enter into future CDS transactions.
On the other hand, the institutional concentration currently present
in the CDS market, which facilitates the repeat transactions that in-
centivize fair play, is also undesirable in the systemically endangering
ways described in detail in section III(B)(2). CDS insider trading pol-
icy should be set with an active aspiration for the future ideal rather
than a submissive acceptance of the current reality. It is true that
broader participation in the CDS market weakens traders' incentive
107. Id. at 651-52. An important distinction should be noted between the Misappropriation
Model and the Equal Access Model. Misappropriation theory holds that outsiders who gain
access to material, non-public information from an insider owe a duty to that insider not to trade
with that information. Because the insider cannot lawfully trade with the information, any to
whom they entrust the information and who subsequently trade with that information breaches a
duty to the insider (and the same duty applies to any additional outsiders who obtain informa-
tion in a way that can be reasonably traced to the insider). See id. Those who trade with mate-
rial, non-public information obtained by applying "superior experience, foresight, or industry,"
rather than through simply having access to the information because of one's position within the
firm (or being tipped about such information in a way that can be traced to a source who ob-
tained the information because of her position in the firm) do not do so unlawfully; such practice
drives the investment profession and was the essence of the Equal Access Model's dismissal.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240.
108. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 97.
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to play fairly because a greater pool of potential counterparties
reduces traders' interest in protecting future trading relationships de-
creases. However, regulation can compensate for this weakened in-
centive by attaching a fiduciary duty to protection sellers.
To keep with the public interest of maintaining consistent financial
regulation, 10 9 CDS regulation should also, as securities regulation has,
extend its fiduciary duty to include misappropriation. Fortunately, the
policy argument is quite strong for implementing a Misappropriation
Model into CDS markets similar to the model that currently exists in
securities markets. The Misappropriation Model only requires that a
user of inside information breach a duty to the source of that informa-
tion. Surely a protection buyer breaches a duty to its borrower when
it uses the borrower's confidential information to dupe an unsuspect-
ing protection seller into a poor bargain.
The breach is especially egregious because the borrower has strong
interests in the protection seller bargaining with symmetrical informa-
tion. A protection buyer bargaining with asymmetrical information is
likely to use that advantage to the detriment of the borrower. Know-
ing that the borrower's financial condition is in decline, the further-
ance of which will not hurt and may even help the protection buyer
because of its CDSs, the protection buyer will neglect its implied re-
sponsibilities to assist in the borrower's revival, perhaps even to the
point of sabotage.
When the protection buyer is forced to bargain with symmetrical
information, the parties will transact CDSs on terms more favorable
to the protection seller. Because the interests of protection sellers and
borrowers are aligned, protection sellers will bargain in ways
favorable to borrowers. Better-informed protection sellers are thus
better advocates for borrowers, making the protection buyer's use of
asymmetrical information about the borrower a breach of duty to that
borrower.
CONCLUSION: INSIDER TRADING IN CDS MARKETS SHOULD
BE REGULATED
Credit default swaps have revolutionized lending policy and trans-
formed the financial marketplace. The 2008 market crash frighten-
ingly revealed that CDSs also possess systemically dangerous
attributes. CDS regulation should proceed cautiously to further CDS
development and channel CDS power to market-building uses. SEC
v. Rorech is the most significant regulatory challenge CDSs have con-
109. See remarks of SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, supra notes 75-76.
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fronted in a court of law. A comparison to securities market regula-
tion suggests that Rorech may be the first step in a disjointed CDS
insider trading regulation path.
However, CDS regulation certainly will build upon lessons learned
from securities regulation, allowing it to carve out a more workable
regulatory landscape with much less hassle. For example, this paper
described how the fiduciary duty and misappropriation principles cur-
rently present in securities regulation would similarly provide CDS
regulators with both a legal justification and a sensible framework to
enforce CDS insider trading laws and regulations. When a protection
buyer misappropriates the confidential information of its borrowers to
engage in practices adverse-or with reasonable potential to become
adverse-to that borrower, the law should view the protection buyer's
action as a breach of duty to the borrower.
To determine if CDS insider trading regulation is worth its burdens,
this paper also reviewed policy arguments relating to insider trading in
securities markets and applied them to CDS markets. The analysis
revealed that while insider trading in CDS markets may increase pric-
ing efficiency, such a benefit-if it in fact exists-does not outweigh
the significant harms insider trading imposes into the CDS market.
Other arguments deregulators have previously posed in securities reg-
ulation analysis at best weakly apply to CDS markets.
A prohibition on insider trading will help contain the moral hazards
that currently plague the CDS market. More importantly, insider
trading regulation will promote confidence in CDS markets, a timely
benefit given the waning public confidence in financial markets gener-
ally. Restored public confidence would in turn invite increased liquid-
ity into the CDS market, helping to cure the undesirable and
systemically endangering institutional concentration from which CDSs
currently suffer. In short, enacting CDS insider trading regulation is
one intelligent step in the ongoing effort to revive the financial
marketplace.
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